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INTRODUCTION
Politics-especially electoral politics-is a dirty business. Part of
this is certainly due to the nature of our political system: politicians
raise money to win campaigns, and donors often give money to win
on issues. Invariably, this leads to the exchange of money in hopes of
currying favor. Some of this so-called "corruption" is ultimately just a
part of the business of politics. Nevertheless, such an appearance of
corruption-or actual corruption itself-has a destabilizing effect on
our democracy and the functionality of our national institutions.'
To fight this evil, and to provide voters with information
regarding sources of financial support, Congress and the states have
passed tomes of campaign finance law in hopes that such regulation
will ferret out corruption.2 This legislative activity, however, conflicts
with both the constitutionally protected right to free speech and the
similarly protected right to freedom of association. Disclosure
arguably places a cost on those speaking in the political forum by
requiring them to identify themselves and their means. In the
process, it also forces these participants to reveal those who have
associated with them by way of contribution. Such infringement
strikes directly at the heart of the First Amendment. Our political
freedoms are "democracy's lifeblood"3 and thus should be reasonably
protected from such governmental intrusion. Yet, at the same time,
courts have found that our government, at both the state and federal
levels, should be allowed some measure by which to ensure that the
seeds of corruption do not take hold and that our democracy is
properly functioning.' Thus, our courts have regularly been
* Copyright © 2009 by PJ Puryear.
1. See FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)
("Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials are influenced to act
contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or
infusions of money into their campaigns.").
2. See generally FED. ELECTION COMM'N, FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN LAWS
(2008), http://www.fec.gov/law/feca/feca.pdf (compiling "[f]ederal campaign laws as an
informative service to the general public").
3. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL), 525 F.3d 274, 284 (4th Cir. 2008).
4. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (per curiam) ("[T]here are
governmental interests sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement,
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summoned to help find the proper balance, ensuring that free speech
is not "chilled, 5 and requiring disclosure laws to be, at the very least,
supported by important governmental interests furthered by
substantially related means.6
With respect to North Carolina, the most recent example of this
constitutional check came in the form of the Fourth Circuit's holding
in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL),7 which struck
down as unconstitutional several of the state's campaign finance
laws.8 N.C. Right to Life, Inc., brought a constitutional challenge
against a state campaign finance law that allowed for the State Board
of Elections to evaluate "contextual factors" in determining whether
particular communications were regulable. 9 The state's definition of
"political committee" and its contribution limit on independent
expenditures were also challenged." The court, in a 2-1 decision,
found for N.C. Right to Life on all three issues, holding both that the
state's definition of "express advocacy"" and its definition of
"political committee" were overbroad, 2 and that it could not apply
particularly when the 'functioning of our national institutions' is involved." (quoting
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 97 (1961))).
5. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. -. , 127 S. Ct. 2652,
2665-66 (2007); FEC v. Colo. Rep. Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 471 (2001);
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101 n.20 (1982); NCRL,
525 F.3d at 279 n.2.
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64-65.
7. 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008).
8. NCRL, 525 F.3d at 274. For a discussion of North Carolina's other attempts at
regulating political speech, see generally B. Chad Bungard, You Can't Touch This: A
Lesson to Legislators on Political Speech, 1 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 13 (2003).
9. NCRL, 525 F.3d at 281.
10. Id. at 278-79, 283. NCRL did not include any challenges to the disclosure laws
discussed in this Recent Development. It did, however, lead to curative legislation that
directly affects the applicability and constitutionality of the disclosure laws, as discussed
later in this Recent Development. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
11. Id. at 283-84. "Express advocacy" is defined as communication that expressly
supports or opposes a candidate for office, or is the functional equivalent of such
communication. Id. at 281-82. "Functional equivalent" has been defined as being subject
to no other reasonable interpretation than in support or opposition of a candidate. FEC v.
Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2667 (2007). The difference
between "issue" and "express" advocacy is detailed in the discussion of WRTL. See infra
notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
12. NCRL, 525 F.3d at 286-90. The state had defined "political committee" as any
committee with "a major purpose to support or oppose the nomination or election of one
or more clearly identified candidates." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.6(14) (2007). The
court, however, held that only a definition that confined committees to those with "the
major purpose" of such advocacy was allowable, as the switch in article ("the" to "a")
broadens the definition to encompass organizations "primarily engaging in protected
political speech." NCRL, 525 F.3d at 290.
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contribution limits to independent expenditure committees. 3 Such
regulations, the court opined, extended beyond the allowable limit,
unconstitutionally burdening "the ordinary political speech that is
democracy's lifeblood.' '
4
It seems without fail that this dance-one featuring Congress or
state legislatures passing campaign finance legislation, followed by
constitutional challenges of such laws-will continue to force states
such as North Carolina to find alternative, narrower means to tackle
problematic political issues such as corruption and transparency.
Interestingly, as part of its analysis in NCRL, the court noted such
"narrower means [already] exist for North Carolina to achieve its
regulatory objectives," namely, the state's disclosure laws. 5 The
majority added that such laws or their equivalent can "produce the
same benefits of transparency and accountability while only imposing
regulatory burdens on communications that are unambiguously
campaign related."'6
This Recent Development considers whether, in light of the
changing landscape of campaign finance, certain North Carolina laws
requiring disclosure of contributions and expenditures can survive a
constitutional challenge. First, this Recent Development will offer a
brief explanation of each of these disclosure lawsT--North Carolina's
independent expenditures disclosure law, 8  electioneering
communications disclosure law,19  and candidate-specific
communications disclosure law.2" Then, this piece will conduct an
13. NCRL, 525 F.3d at 291-95.
14. Id. at 284.
15. Id. at 290.
16. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Contra id. at 331
(Michael, J., dissenting) ("[North Carolina's disclosure law constitutes] a minimalist
approach for regulating organizations with a major purpose of electoral advocacy; it would
significantly undermine the state's interest in data collection and deterrence because it
would allow these organizations to avoid the careful accounting and regular reporting
requirements that enable the state to undertake prompt investigation of incidents of
potential misconduct.").
17. By "disclosure laws" I mean statutory requirements for reporting of contributions
and expenditures, as opposed to disclaimer laws which require statements of endorsement
from candidates or committees on campaign-related advertising.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.12 (2007).
19. Id. § 163-278.81 (2007).
20. Id. § 163-278.101 (2007). Both sections 163-278.81 and 163-278.101 of the General
Statutes of North Carolina have sister statutes with the exact same language that extend
the regulation to mass mailings and telephone banks. See id. §§ 163-278.91, .111. While
not discussed in this Recent Development, should these sister statutes be challenged, they
would be subject to the same constitutional analysis applied to sections 163-278.81 and
163-278.101 of the General Statutes of North Carolina.
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analysis of previous scrutiny decisions, concluding that recent
Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit decisions suggest an application of
intermediate scrutiny to such disclosure laws. These decisions,
however, also indicate a willingness-if not an eagerness-to strike
down any law that steps one toe beyond the "express advocacy"
line,2' or any law in which governmental interests are lacking.22
Following that analysis, this Recent Development will apply
intermediate scrutiny to the North Carolina laws to conclude that
North Carolina's independent expenditure disclosure law is
constitutional, its electioneering communications disclosure law is
constitutional but should be narrowed, and its candidate-specific
communications disclosure law would fail a constitutional challenge.
I. NORTH CAROLINA'S DISCLOSURE LAWS
North Carolina's disclosure laws trigger reporting requirements
for most expenditures that specifically name a candidate. 23  These
laws and electioneering communication disclosure laws cover: (1)
independent expenditures that support or oppose a candidate; (2)
"electioneering communications," which are communications naming
a candidate that are made thirty days before the primary and sixty
days before the general election;24 and (3) "candidate-specific
communications," which are communications outside of the thirty-
and sixty-day windows, made in an even-numbered year, that name a
candidate.25 Violation of the independent expenditures disclosure law
can result in criminal penalties, 6 and violation of any of the disclosure
laws can result in civil penalties.27 Importantly, differences exist
between the three laws-these differences are detailed below.
21. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2652,
2764 (2007).
22. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL), 525 F.3d 274, 295 (4th Cir.
2008) (finding that placing limits on independent expenditure spending failed to further
the state's interest in preventing corruption).
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.12, .81, .101 (2007).
24. Id. § 163-278.80(2).
25. Id. § 163-278.100(1).
26. Id. § 163-278.27. Violation brings with it a "Class 2" misdemeanor charge. Id.
§ 163-278.83.
27. Id. §§ 163-278.34, .83, .102. These include daily penalties for lateness, up to three
times the amount of a contribution or expenditure for which concealment or illegality is
found, and various other civil remedies including, but not limited to, cease and desist
orders and remedial actions. Id. § 163-278.34.
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A. Independent Expenditures Disclosure Law
North Carolina's independent expenditures disclosure law
requires reporting for any expenditure greater than one hundred
dollars, made independent of a political committee, that supports or
opposes a candidate. 28 An "independent expenditure" is defined as
an "expenditure to support or oppose the nomination or election of
one or more clearly identified candidates that is made without
consultation or coordination with a candidate or agent of a candidate
whose nomination or election the expenditure supports or whose
opponent's nomination or election the expenditure opposes."29 Such
disclosure must be made within thirty days of the expenditure or ten
days prior to the election it seeks to influence, whichever occurs
first.3" The reporting requirements are left to the State Board of
Elections.31
B. Electioneering Communications Disclosure Law
In addition to requiring disclosure for independent expenditures,
North Carolina requires disclosure for a wider range of
communications made within a certain proximity to an election. The
state's electioneering communications disclosure law requires
disclosure when an entity spends more than $10,000 either thirty days
before the primary election or sixty days before the general election
on "targeted" communications that name a "clearly identified
candidate" for a state-level office.32 A "targeted" communication is
any communication that "can be received by 50,000 or more
individuals in the State in the case of a candidacy for statewide office
and 7,500 or more individuals in the district in the case of a candidacy
for General Assembly."33 The statute does contain exceptions from
the definition,34  such as "independent expenditures" or any
communications that reference an issue before the General Assembly
while it is in session.35
28. Id. § 163-278.12.
29. Id. § 163-278.6(9a).
30. Id. § 163-278.12.
31. Id.
32. Id. §§ 163-278.80, .81.
33. Id. § 163-278.80(5). This disclosure law is modeled after its federal counterpart, as
created by the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA"). See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)
(2006).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.80(3) (2007).
35. Id. § 163-278.80(3)(d). Thus, for example, a $50,000 expenditure on television ads
that is "targeted" and falls within one of the election windows would not have to be
reported if the advertisement called on citizens to contact Speaker Joe Hackney in support
1256 [Vol. 87
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Unlike the independent expenditures disclosure law, the
electioneering communications disclosure law specifies the contents
of the reports, which must be filed within twenty-four hours of the
expenditure.36  The name of the party or entity making the
expenditure, its principal place of business, every expenditure greater
than $1,000, the election and candidate of subject, and the names of
all those that gave greater than $1,000 to the party making the
expenditure must be included.37
C. Candidate-specific Communications Disclosure Law
The final relevant section is North Carolina's candidate-specific
communications disclosure law, which is an extension of the
electioneering communications law to the remainder of the election
year. Any party that spends more than $10,000 in aggregate on
"targeted" communications that name a candidate for state-level or
General Assembly office during an even-numbered year and outside
of the thirty- and sixty-day windows covered by the electioneering
communications disclosure law is also subject to disclosure
requirements.3 8  Given that the deadline for filing is typically
February of the election year for state-level offices, and the election is
held on the first Tuesday of November, this statute's applicability is
limited to six months out of the two-year election interval.39 Similar
to the electioneering communications disclosure law, all candidate-
specific communications must be disclosed within twenty-four hours
and include the name of the party or entity making the expenditure,
its principal place of business, and every expenditure and contribution
toward expenditures greater than $1,000.40
of a particular bill before the House of Representatives. Interestingly, this exception
applies only to communication that, "incidental to advocacy for or against a specific piece
of legislation pending before the General Assembly, urges the audience to communicate
with a member or members of the General Assembly concerning that piece of legislation."
Id. Therefore, a similar ad that called on the Governor to sign a bill on his desk would not
be subject to the exception and would require disclosure.
36. Compare id. § 163-278.12(c) (leaving determination of reporting requirements to
the State Board of Elections), with id. § 163-278.91(b) (specifying the contents of the
disclosure statement).
37. Id. § 163-278.81.
38. See id. §§ 163-278.100, .101.
39. Assuming a February 1 filing deadline, a May 1 primary, and a November 1
general election, the statute would only be applicable from February through March and
from May though August, because it does not apply to odd-numbered years or to the
thirty- and sixty-day windows covered by the electioneering communications statute. See
id. §§ 163-278.80(2)b, .100(1)b.
40. Id. § 163-278.101.
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II. SCRUTINY AND SUCCESS
The determination of whether a reviewing court would apply
intermediate or strict scrutiny is paramount in determining whether
these three disclosure laws would pass constitutional muster. This
determination is not as simple as one would hope; both the Supreme
Court and the circuit courts have vacillated between an application of
strict and intermediate scrutiny with respect to disclosure laws.4'
Unclear language in precedential cases, as well as the application of
reasoning from prominent cases in campaign finance that do not
solely deal with disclosure laws,42 are both potential culprits for this
confusion. Arguably, the conservative evolution of the bench has also
begun to play a role in analysis and outcome.43  While a careful
parsing of the Supreme Court's precedent seems to suggest
application of intermediate scrutiny to disclosure laws, defenders of
such laws should still be prepared for the possibility of a more
exacting scrutiny.
Before examining the Court's handling of scrutiny
determinations, a quick review of the levels of constitutional scrutiny
is in order. The Supreme Court has traditionally used three different
levels of scrutiny when determining the constitutionality of a law, two
of which are particularly relevant: intermediate scrutiny and strict
scrutiny.' Intermediate scrutiny, first appearing in 1976 in Craig v.
41. This ambiguity has even left one Justice scratching his head. See Buckley v. Am.
Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 208 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring).
42. See generally McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (reviewing several different
provisions, including disclosure laws, of BCRA); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.
(MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (addressing the constitutionality of regulation of corporate
expenditures and disclosure of those expenditures); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(per curiam) (addressing the constitutionality of contribution and expenditure limits,
reporting requirements, and creation of Federal Election Commission).
43. See Jonathan D. Salant, Republicans File Suit to Overturn McCain Finance Law,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 13, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=asHJmtllNmzo. Not only will the Court hear Republicans' challenge to
BCRA provisions that prohibit contributions from corporate and union money, but it has
also agreed to hear challenges to BCRA in regard to Hillary: The Movie, and whether
BCRA covers feature length films under its express advocacy provisions. See Adam
Liptak, Justices Agree to Hear Case on Anti-Clinton Film, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, at
A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/15/washington/15scotus.html.
Irrespective of the subject matter of a challenged election law, deference to state interests
in regulating elections may also affect the decisions rendered by a conservative bench. See
Meredith Hattendorf, Theoretical Splits and Consistent Results on Anonymous Political
Speech: Majors v. Abell and ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 925, 936
(2006) (citing Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Comm'n, 762 A.2d 880 (Conn. 2000), as
an example of the role of such deference).
44. The third level of scrutiny is the rational basis test, which, when applied, typically
means a law is constitutional if there is a plausible justification behind the law that is
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Boren,45 requires that a law "serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to those objectives"46 in order to
survive a constitutional challenge. Strict scrutiny, on the other hand,
requires that a law be supported by a compelling governmental
interest and be "narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."47 Strict
scrutiny, the most exacting standard applied by the courts, has been
dubbed the "kiss of death," because it is almost always fatal when
applied.48 As such, the determination of the appropriate level of
scrutiny plays a significant role in whether a law will survive a
constitutional challenge. Typically, when a law affects a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution, such as free speech, courts will
apply strict scrutiny.49 In regards to free speech, however, if the
regulation is not prohibitive or "pose[s] a less substantial risk of
excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue," a court
will apply intermediate scrutiny."
The starting point of any scrutiny analysis with respect to
campaign finance disclosure laws is the seminal case of Buckley v.
Valeo.51 Buckley involved a challenge to the Federal Election
Campaign Act's contribution limits, disclosure laws, and public
financing scheme.52 The Court, in its evaluation of the disclosure laws
at issue, noted that "compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously
infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First
Amendment."53  As such, the Court stated that it had long
"recognized that significant encroachments on First Amendment
rights of the sort that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be
justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental
interest."54 Instead, the Court found that disclosure laws in general
rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. For a discussion of the rational
basis test, see generally FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-16 (1993).
45. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
46. Id. at 197.
47. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2654
(2007).
48. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 380 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 870 (2006)
(analyzing the application of strict scrutiny and concluding that "[s]trict scrutiny is not,
generally speaking, fatal in fact").
49. Winkler, supra note 48, at 799.
50. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
51. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
52. Id. at 1.
53. Id. at 64.
54. Id.
2009] 1259
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must pass an "exacting scrutiny,"55 requiring "relevant correlation or
substantial relation between the government interests and the
information required to be disclosed. '5 6 The Court endorsed this level
of review because "disclosure requirements 'appear to be the least
restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and
corruption that Congress found to exist.' "57
Yet, just as Buckley served as an important starting point for a
scrutiny determination with respect to disclosure laws, it also served
as a starting point for thirty years of confusion. Not more than ten
pages after setting what seemed to be an intermediate scrutiny
standard for disclosure laws, the Court, in its review of the federal
independent expenditure disclosure law, stated it was applying a
"strict standard of scrutiny."" This has led some commentators to
believe Buckley indeed espoused strict scrutiny for disclosure laws.59
Nevertheless, in its analysis of that provision, the Court found the
provision constitutional as it "[bore] a sufficient relationship to a
substantial governmental interest,"'  language suggesting an
application of a more intermediate level of scrutiny.
The Court revisited the issue ten years later in FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), 1 striking down a state
statute establishing detailed recordkeeping requirements and
disclosure requirements for corporations making independent
expenditures.6' In doing so, the Court stated that "[i]ndependent
expenditures constitute expression at the core of our electoral process
and of the First Amendment freedoms. We must therefore determine
whether the [statute at issue] burdens political speech, and if so,
whether such a burden is justified by a compelling state interest."63
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, but explained that she
55. Id.
56. Id. at 64 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
57. Ohio Right to Life Soc'y, Inc. v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, No. 2:08-cv-00492, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79165, at *24 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2008) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. at 68).
58. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. at 75.
59. See Miriam Galston, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and Justifications for
Campaign Finance Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. L.J. 1181, 1200 (2007);
Rhodes Beahm Ritenour, Federal Campaign Finance Reform Based on Virginia Election
Law: The Carson Act as a Simple, Effective, and Constitutional Means to Curb Corruption
in the Financing of Federal Campaigns, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 123, 136 (2007).
60. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 80.
61. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
62. Id. at 262 (finding the state's interests could be met with less intrusive disclosure
requirements than the "full panoply of regulations that accompany status as a political
committee" imposed by the statute at issue).
63. Id. at 251-52 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
1260 [Vol. 87
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feared the Court was moving away from the standard set forth in
Buckley. She specifically criticized Buckley for failing to differentiate
between the standards applied to disclosure laws as opposed to
detailed recordkeeping requirements.' 4 O'Connor believed disclosure
laws-and specifically independent expenditure disclosure laws at
issue in Buckley-constituted a "reasonable and minimally restrictive
method of furthering First Amendment values '65 and thus should be
subjected to a lesser scrutiny. 66
In 2003, the Court again reviewed disclosure laws in McConnell
v. FEC67 and reverted back to intermediate scrutiny. While the Court
never explicitly stated the level of scrutiny with which it reviewed the
disclosure requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
("BCRA") § 201, it made clear in finding BCRA's disclosure
requirements constitutional that it was not heightening its level of
review to that of strict scrutiny.'M The Court's opinion, in as much as
it dealt with disclosure requirements, did not contain any reference to
strict scrutiny or to the phrase "compelling state interest." Instead
the Court found that "the important state interests" sufficient in
Buckley also applied to BCRA, supporting the "application of [the]
disclosure requirements to the entire range of 'electioneering
communications.' ,69
Though it appeared the Court had finally returned to its original
position-applying intermediate scrutiny for disclosure laws-it took
only four short years (and two new justices) for the Court to return to
its sweeping (and confusing) statements. In 2007, the Roberts Court
64. Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 82).
66. While it may seem odd to have a scrutiny determination turn on the burden
created by the statute (as opposed to having the burden weighed in determining whether
the statute meets the applicable level of scrutiny), O'Connor's concurrence is not alone.
See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1997)
("Regulations imposing severe burdens ... must be narrowly tailored and advance a
compelling state interest. Lesser burdens, however, trigger less exacting review, and a
State's important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions.") (citations omitted); Elizabeth Garrett, The Future of
Campaign Finance Reform Laws in the Courts and in Congress, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
665, 689 (2002) ("[Mlore aggressive disclosure laws will receive more exacting scrutiny
from courts.").
67. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
68. Id. at 196. Another indication that the McConnell Court did not apply strict
scrutiny to the disclosure laws at issue comes in its explicit statement that it would not
apply strict scrutiny to the contribution limits at issue, which presumably must meet a
higher burden. Id. at 137.
69. Id. at 196. The Court did, however, analyze BCRA's prohibition of certain
disbursements in the electioneering communications window. See id. at 203-04.
2009] 1261
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reviewed an as-applied challenge to BCRA's electioneering
communication law in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL). 70
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, explained that as
BCRA "burdens political speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny ....
Under strict scrutiny, the Government must prove that applying
BCRA to WRTL's ads furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest. ' 71
Despite its use in WRTL, later decisions display a reluctance to
use the strict scrutiny standard simply because the law at issue
burdens political speech. Just a year later, the Supreme Court
clarified in Davis v. FEC, 7 noting that it had
closely scrutinized disclosure requirements, including
requirements governing independent expenditures made to
further individuals' political speech. To survive this scrutiny,
significant encroachments cannot be justified by a mere
showing of some legitimate governmental interest. Instead,
there must be a relevant correlation or substantial relation
between the governmental interest and the information required
to be disclosed, and the governmental interest must survive
exacting scrutiny. That is, the strength of the governmental
interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on
First Amendment rights.73
Other courts have criticized WRTL's sweeping language, and have
suggested that the Court's chosen level of scrutiny should be limited
to that opinion.74 Part of the reasoning behind this preference for a
lesser scrutiny for disclosure laws results from the dichotomy detailed
in Buckley. While compelled disclosure can infringe upon First
Amendment rights, the state has a significant interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance thereof and must be afforded some
measure by which to fulfill that interest. Buckley found that
disclosure laws were the "least restrictive" to meet that interest, and
70. 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
71. Id. at 2664 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
72. 554 U.S. __, 128B S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
73. Id. at 2775 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
74. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding
application of WRTL's language to disclosure requirements cut against the Court's
approving language of "disclosure provisions triggered by political speech even though the
speech itself was constitutionally protected under the First Amendment"); Ohio Right to
Life Soc'y, Inc. v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, No. 2:08-cv-00492, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79165, at *26 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2008) ("The WRTL Court made clear that the Court was
only considering the constitutionality of the BCRA's federal electioneering funding
prohibition .... The WRTL Court did not even mention disclosure requirements, much
less their constitutionality.").
1262 [Vol. 87
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thus should be subject to a lesser standard than strict scrutiny, despite
the Court's use of that phrase in its opinion.75
Buckley and its misuse of the words "exacting" and "strict" in
describing the level of scrutiny it applied are not the only causes of
the confusion. MCFL's failure to distinguish its evaluation of
disclosure laws from the "additional organization restraints
imposed 76 by the statute at issue arguably worsened the ambiguity.
So too did subsequent courts' reliance on precedent either not
involving or not limited to disclosure laws regarding contributions
and expenditures.77 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,78 for
instance, has been an underpinning of scrutiny determinations in
disclosure cases,79 despite being focused solely on review of a
statutory prohibition of anonymous distribution campaign literature
as opposed to finance disclosure issues.80 Continuing this poor design,
the McIntyre Court relied on First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti8" to inform its standard determination, notwithstanding the
absence of any disclosure consideration in Bellotti.82
In addition, many cases involving disclosure laws, Buckley
included, deal with campaign finance law issues beyond disclosure of
expenditures and contributions. It is in these cases that we find many
of the sweeping statements83 that give rise to the application of an
75. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (per curiam). Buckley also found that, in
some instances, where the level of potential corruption may not be sufficient to justify
governmental intrusion, the "informational interest" may be sufficient if it "helps voters to
define more of the candidates' constituencies." Id. at 81 (1976).
76. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 265 (2006) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
77. See, e.g., Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1101-02 (9th Cir.
2003) (relying on McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), in its scrutiny
determination).
78. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
79. See, e.g., Alaska Right to Life Comm. v. Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 788 (9th Cir. 2006)
(applying McIntyre's reasoning as basis for strict scrutiny analysis of disclosure laws); Cal.
Pro-Life Council v. Getman, 328 F.3d at 1101 (citing McIntyre as precedent establishing
that any law burdening political speech must be subjected to strict scrutiny). But see Ohio
Right to Life Soc'y, Inc. v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, No. 2:08-cv-00492, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 79165, at *29-30 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2008) (finding McIntyre inapplicable to review
of disclosure statute).
80. McIntyre, 514 U.S. 336. The Court decided "[w]hen a law burdens core political
speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve an overriding state interest." Id. at 347.
81. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
82. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 ("When a law burdens core political speech, we apply
exacting scrutiny, and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an
overriding state interest." (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786)).
83. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. -_, 127 S. Ct. 2652,
2664 (2007) (requiring the government to show a compelling governmental interest which
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overbearing standard by some lower courts.84 Because these cases
deal with more than one type of campaign finance law, they also deal
with more than one type of scrutiny. This lack of distinction has
served as another root of confusion.85
Arguably, the conservative evolution of the Supreme Court has
also begun to play a role in scrutiny determination. While precedent
reveals a willingness to apply intermediate scrutiny when reviewing
disclosure laws, the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito could result in the Court heightening its scrutiny analysis. 6
Chief Justice Roberts made clear his preference for strict scrutiny in
WRTL, 87 and Justice Alito has shown a steady skepticism for
campaign finance law.88 Neither, however, has joined in other
justices' ongoing quest to overturn Buckley. While other members of
the conservative bloc have shown some support of disclosure laws,89
this does not necessarily reflect a disdain for a strict scrutiny analysis
is narrowly tailored); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 (holding that when laws interfere with
"core political speech," then "exacting scrutiny" is applied); ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378
F.3d 979, 992 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing how, under strict scrutiny, any "content-based
limitation on core political speech" will be constitutional only if "it is narrowly tailored to
serve an overriding state interest").
84. Cal. Pro-Life Council v. Getman, 328 F.3d at 1101 (requiring a compelling state
interest to justify California campaign finance disclosure laws); Citizens for Responsible
Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000)
(applying "exacting scrutiny" to a Nevada finance disclosure statute).
85. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25, 64 (1976) (per curiam) (applying strict
scrutiny to contribution limits and a lesser scrutiny to disclosure requirements).
86. See generally Daniel R. Ortiz, A Symposium on Campaign Finance Reform: Past,
Present, and Future, "The Difference Two Justices Make: FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc. II and the Destabilization of Campaign Finance Regulation, 1 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 141
(2008) (arguing that the addition of Roberts and Alito to the Supreme Court has shifted
the Court's purview with regard to campaign finance laws).
87. WRTL, 551 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2664; see supra notes 70-71 and
accompanying text.
88. Adam Liptak, Alito's Way: Changes on the Court Usher in a Reversal of Course
on Campaign Reform, COLUM. LAW SCH. MAG., Nov. 2008, at 44 (noting that, since his
appointment, "[Justice Alito] has voted with the majority to strike down laws regulating
money in politics"). However, Justice Alito authored the majority opinion in Davis v.
FEC, 554 U.S. -, 128B S. Ct. 2759 (2008), which seemingly reaffirmed the scrutiny
preference laid down in Buckley: "[T]here must be 'a relevant correlation or substantial
relation between the governmental interest and the information required to be
disclosed,' " and the governmental interest "must survive exacting scrutiny." Id. at 2775
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64).
89. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 707 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (finding that a "more narrow alternative of recordkeeping and
funding disclosure [was] available" and acceptable).
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of those laws. Notwithstanding, defenders of campaign finance laws
should beware of a more skeptical Court.9"
While this evolution may affect the Court's scrutiny decision,
both a careful parsing of the precedent and comparison to similarly
restrictive laws provide strong, if not certain, grounds for the
application of intermediate scrutiny. Despite the Court's vacillation,
Buckley and its progeny suggest the application of a lesser standard
than strict scrutiny when disclosure laws are at issue. This seems most
predicated upon the idea that disclosure laws, such as those in North
Carolina, impose a lesser burden than other campaign finance laws
and thus should trigger a less exacting review.9 As such, the "State's
important regulatory interests [should] be enough to justify
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions."92 Application of
intermediate scrutiny to similarly restrictive laws also supports this
contention. For instance, the Court has routinely found that
disclosure requirements pertaining to lobbying activity are subject to
intermediate scrutiny.93 Nevertheless, it is well within reason that a
court could find a disclosure law before it was not the least
burdensome, and thus should be subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis.
Just as likely, a court could take cues from more conservative
members of the Supreme Court bench and find simply that the
disclosure law before it "burdens political speech, [and thus] is subject
to strict scrutiny."'94
Part of both the scrutiny analysis detailed above and the result
reached by a court will vary depending on the governmental interests
supporting the law and the level of intrusion the law creates through
its application. Once again, Buckley serves as the starting ground for
90. Arguably, this shift on the Court played a role in North Carolina's decision to
simply redraft the laws at issue in NCRL to reflect the majority's opinion, as opposed to
take the case to the Supreme Court. The considerable time the majority in NCRL spends
refuting the dissenting opinion seems to suggest the State had a strong argument in
support of the laws at issue, yet the State simply yielded in its defense.
91. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1997); see also
Elizabeth Garrett, The Future of Campaign Finance Reform Laws in the Courts and in
Congress, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 665, 689 (2002) ("[Mlore aggressive disclosure laws
will receive more exacting scrutiny from courts.").
92. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358-59 (quoting Burdick v. Takashi, 504 U.S. 428, 434
(1992)).
93. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (applying intermediate
scrutiny and finding that the government had asserted sufficient interests in "maintain[ing]
the integrity of a basic governmental process"). For a summary of circuit court application
of intermediate scrutiny to lobbying disclosure laws, see Florida League of Professional
Lobbyists v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 460 (11th Cir. 1996).
94. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2664
(2007).
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the determination of the applicable governmental interests. "First,
disclosure provides the electorate with information as to where
political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the
candidate in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek ...
office."95 Also, by exposing campaign activity, disclosure laws seek to
"deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by
exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of
publicity."96 Third, disclosure requirements "are an essential means
of gathering the data necessary to detect violations."97  This list,
however, is by no means universally agreed upon, with some
members of the Court believing only the second interest-preventing
corruption or the appearance thereof-is of any merit.98
Notwithstanding, each interest itself may be sufficient to pass
constitutional muster.99
The degree of strength accorded to each of these interests varies
based upon the disclosure law itself and the intrusion for which it
calls. For instance, a law requiring disclosure irrespective of the
political calendar may justify less intrusion than one mandating
disclosure only in close proximity to elections, when the need for an
informed electorate reaches its zenith. Other potential intrusions that
may leave a court wanting for a less intrusive measure could include
requiring disclosure of contributions or expenditures of insignificant
sums or requiring some form of unnecessarily immediate disclosure.
While these intrusions could be the "kiss of death" 100 for
disclosure laws-particularly if subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis-
one other First Amendment issue looms large over a disclosure law's
success. Namely, does the disclosure law regulate or affect more than
express advocacy? In Buckley, the Court recognized the legislature's
95. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (per curiam) (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-564,
at 4 (1971)).
96. Id. at 67; see also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 202
(1999) (finding the deterrence of corruption a legitimate government interest).
97. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 67-68; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196
(2003) (discussing weight given to data collection as state interest).
98. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 291-92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (concluding that
regulations must "advance the anticorruption interest" to survive a constitutional
challenge). But see id. at 196 ("We agree with the District Court that the important state
interests that prompted the Buckley Court to uphold FECA's disclosure requirements-
providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any
appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive
electioneering restrictions-apply in full to BCRA.").
99. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 81.
100. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 380 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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power to "establish standards [governing] ... political campaigns,"
while simultaneously acknowledging that such restrictions "threaten
to limit ordinary 'political expression.' ""10 As such, Buckley held that
only activity that was "unambiguously [campaign] related" could be
regulable, as only such activity could implicate the governmental
interests that supported intrusions accompanying the regulation of
political speech."° "In particular, Buckley delineated specific words
that exemplify such 'express advocacy'-words such as 'vote for,'
'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote
against,' 'defeat,' [and] 'reject.' "103 If such words were missing, the
communication was not express but issue advocacy, and thus
unregulable given a lack of any sufficient governmental interest.
It became clear, however, that one could avoid these "magic
words," and thus avoid regulation, despite the fact that such
communications were expressly advocating the victory or defeat of a
particular candidate. This concern for "sham issue ads" in turn gave
rise to the recognition of a legislature's ability to regulate the
"functional equivalent" of express advocacy) °4 One example of the
regulation of functional equivalence is BCRA's definition and
regulation of "electioneering communications," which are those made
in the thirty- and sixty-day windows prior to primary and general
elections.105
While such a standard initially provided a platform for
legislatures to extend their regulations to encompass some issue
advocacy, WRTL narrowed the definition of speech that could be
considered the functional equivalent of express advocacy.
Specifically, the court redefined the term such that it applied only to
advocacy being "susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate."'' 0 6 In
WRTL, this meant finding that BCRA could not constitutionally
apply to the ads at issue, which asked citizens to call on Wisconsin's
senators in regard to an abortion bill before Congress, even though
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., planned to run the ads during BCRA's
blackout period. 0 7  Despite never dealing with disclosure laws,
101. N.C. Right to Life v. Leake (NCRL), 525 F.3d 274, 281 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 13-14).
102. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 80.
103. NCRL, 525 F.3d at 281 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52).
104. Id. at 281-82.
105. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (2006).
106. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2667
(2007).
107. Id. at 2663.
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WRTL signaled a significant shift: laws regulating communication
beyond "express" advocacy beware. As discussed below, application
of WRTL's limitation could be fatal for two of North Carolina's
disclosure laws.
Depending on the construction of each disclosure law, each of
the abovementioned governmental interests and intrusions could be
implicated in a court's constitutional determination. Ultimately,
under an intermediate scrutiny review, some intrusion will be
tolerated in cases where governmental interests are substantial and
sufficiently related to the disclosure sought. Where the intrusion
becomes too great or the interest too attenuated, however, not even a
lesser standard of review may save the law or requirement at issue.
The result of such balancing may well spell the difference between
success and failure for each of North Carolina's disclosure laws.
III. ANALYSIS OF NORTH CAROLINA'S DISCLOSURE LAWS
Applying this knowledge to North Carolina's disclosure laws, we
now turn to the hypothetical constitutional challenge of those laws,
beginning with North Carolina's independent expenditure disclosure
law.
A. Independent Expenditures Disclosure Law
Independent expenditures "constitute expression 'at the core of
our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.' "108 The
courts have dealt with independent expenditure disclosure laws on
numerous occasions and have found that if the disclosure law "bears a
sufficient relationship to a substantial governmental interest," then it
can be found constitutional."° That interest in North Carolina's case
could easily be any of the three laid down in Buckley."' As for
bearing a sufficient relationship to that interest, independent
expenditure disclosure laws allow "[t]he state interest in disclosure [to
be] met in a manner less restrictive than imposing the full panoply of
regulations that accompany status as a political committee.""'
108. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 251-52 (1986) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 39).
109. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 80. But see Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman,
328 F.3d 1088, 1101 n.16 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying strict scrutiny to California's
independent expenditure disclosure laws).
110. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
111. Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Randolph, 507 F.3d 1172, 1189 (9th Cir. 2007)
(quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 262).
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Importantly, even if the law is supported by a substantial
governmental interest, it must also be limited in its application to
express advocacy as defined by WRTL in order to survive a challenge.
North Carolina's law has been sufficiently cabined to meet such a
limitation, as it applies only to those expenditures that "support or
oppose" a candidate.' 12  The North Carolina General Assembly
attempted to broadly define what it meant to "support or oppose" a
candidate, providing examples of "[elvidence that communications
are 'to support or oppose the nomination or election of one or more
clearly identified candidates,' "113 which included variables the State
Board of Elections could consider in their determination. This
statutory provision, which had the potential to significantly broaden
express advocacy, was one of those found unconstitutional by the
Fourth Circuit in NCRL, and is therefore no longer applicable."4
While the State could have appealed the ruling, it instead elected to
remove the statutory test, thus limiting the definition of "support"
and "oppose" to the tests dictated by the Supreme Court in WRTL.I"
As such, North Carolina's independent expenditure disclosure law is
only applicable to express advocacy, and is thus constitutional." 6
Other challenges could be raised against North Carolina's
independent expenditures disclosure law, however. There are
plausible facial challenges to the statute in regard to the threshold
amount that triggers reporting"7 and the period in which the
disclosure must occur."' Each of these has been a basis of
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.6(9a) (2007).
113. See id. § 163-278.14A(a)(2).
114. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL), 525 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir. 2008).
115. Senate Bill 1263 included, among its provisions, a repeal of the "context standard
for express advocacy" found in section 163-278.14A(a)(2) of the General Statutes of North
Carolina. See WILLIAM R. GILKESON, S. SELECT COMM. ON GOV'T AND ELECTION
REFORM, SENATE BILL 1263: ELECTION LAW AMENDMENTS, 2007-2008 Sess., Reg.
Sess., at 2 (2008). The final version of the bill, which retained this repeal, was signed into
law by then-Governor Easley. See Act of July 18, 2008, sec. 6(b), 2008-3 N.C. Adv. Legis,
Serv. 201, 211 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.14A(a)).
116. Disclosure laws that do not fit into this framework have failed. See, e.g., McIntyre
v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 355-57 (1995) (finding Ohio's independent
expenditure disclosure law impermissibly overbroad due to, inter alia, its application
beyond the support or opposition of a clearly identified candidate). Had the independent
expenditure law applied to more than express advocacy, it may have also encountered due
process concerns triggered by its enforcement via criminal penalties. See, e.g., Ctr. for
Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 664 (5th Cir. 2006).
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.12(a) (2007) (requiring disclosure of amounts in excess
of one hundred dollars).
118. Id. § 163-278.12(d) (requiring disclosure within thirty days of crossing the
threshold contribution amount or ten days before the election, whichever happens first).
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constitutional challenges to disclosure laws in the past." 9 Neither of
these, however, should be sufficient to invalidate the statute.
Requiring reporting by those funding the independent expenditures
helps the State detect possible violations, 120 including, but not limited
to, campaigns routing contributions through independent
expenditures to evade contribution limits applicable to the campaigns
themselves.' 2 ' While one hundred dollars is a relatively low trigger
for the disclosure requirement, such a threshold has been sustained
before.'22 Further, requiring disclosure within thirty days or prior to
the election is certainly not overly burdensome, especially when
compared with North Carolina's other disclosure laws, which require
reporting within twenty-four hours. 123  None of these contentions
seem sufficient to invalidate the statute, whether under Buckley's
"exacting" scrutiny, or, for that matter, under a stricter standard.
A remaining option available to challengers would be an as-
applied challenge, either based on the communication at issue being
outside the scope of express advocacy, or due to a violation of
freedom of association. Each of these requires a challenger to clear a
high bar. First, the narrowing effect of NCRL124 limits the likelihood
that the disclosure law would require disclosure of independent
expenditures constituting issue advocacy. Second, in order for a
freedom of association challenge to succeed, the court would require
a showing that reprisal or harassment was a reasonable probability.1 25
Because the independent expenditure communications law has been
119. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 82-84 (1976) (per curiam) (challenging monetary
thresholds); Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236
F.3d 1174, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2000) (challenging twenty-four hour reporting requirement).
120. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 67-68.
121. In campaign finance cases, the Court has differentiated between contributions and
expenditures limitations with respect to the right of freedom of association. These
discussions, however, only regard limits, not disclosure. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't
Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 386-88 (2000); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 610 (1996); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479
U.S. 238, 259-260 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 20-21.
122. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 82-84 (finding that the determination of such a
threshold was best left to congressional discretion).
123. Both the electioneering communications and candidate-specific communications
disclosure laws require twenty-four hour reporting. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.81,
.101 (2007).
124. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
125. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 74; see also Brown v. Socialist Workers '74
Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101-02 (1982) (finding reasonable probability of threats
resulting from required disclosure and thus holding application of Ohio's disclosure law
unconstitutional).
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cabined by NCRL to apply only to express advocacy, absent such
circumstances it should survive a constitutional challenge.
B. Electioneering Communications Disclosure Law
North Carolina's electioneering communications statute is also
likely to survive a facial constitutional challenge under intermediate
scrutiny. The strongest support for such a contention can be found in
McConnell,l16 where the Supreme Court of the United States upheld
the law's federal counterpart, BCRA § 201.127 There, the Court held
"the important state interests that prompted the Buckley Court to
uphold [the Federal Election Campaign Act's] disclosure
requirements-providing the electorate with information, deterring
actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering
the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering
restrictions-apply in full to BCRA.', 128 The Court also went on to
dismiss the facial challenge to BCRA's disclosure requirements
despite the fact that it could encompass some issue advocacy.129 Such
reasoning should apply to North Carolina's electioneering
communications disclosure law given that it is modeled on BCRA
§ 201. Moreover, these interests-providing information, deterring
corruption, and deterring violations-arguably grow stronger in
relation to the communication's proximity to the election.13° Given
that "electioneering communications" are defined as those made in
the thirty- and sixty-day windows prior to the primary and general
elections, the State has a heightened interest, and the disclosure law
in turn has heightened support and should survive intermediate
scrutiny.
However, as represented by WRTL, the Court has arguably
shifted toward a more skeptical approach when laws encompass issue
advocacy.' By definition, North Carolina's electioneering
communications disclosure law does not encompass any
"independent expenditure[s],"' 13 2 which are defined by statute as those
expenditures which support or oppose a candidate, or, in other words,
126. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 189-200 (2003).
127. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 201, 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2002).
128. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196.
129. Id. at 195-97.
130. Id. at 136-37.
131. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. -_, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2659
(2007) (holding application of BCRA § 203 "unconstitutional as applied to the
advertisements at issue" as they were not express advocacy or its functional equivalent).
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.80(3)(b) (2007).
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are express advocacy.'33 As such, the disclosure law regulates any
communication considered the functional equivalent of express
advocacy, and most issue advocacy mentioning a candidate, during
the relevant thirty- or sixty-day window. Considering the strong
language of WRTL against the regulation of issue advocacy, and its
acceptance by NCRL, it is likely the electioneering communications
disclosure law would be narrowed to apply only to communications
that are the functional equivalent of express advocacy.3 4 As WRTL
has redefined the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy as
advocacy being "susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate,"'35 the
statute's application would be limited to a shadow of its former self.
Although it would seem that the inclusion of any issue advocacy
would be fatal to the disclosure law, "[a] regulation may be struck
down only if it is unconstitutional in a substantial number of
applications or is too vague to provide notice."'36 Luckily for the
electioneering communications disclosure law, it was written to
exclude a certain amount of issue advocacy.
One of the exceptions to all the NC definitions of
"electioneering communications" .. . is this: "A
communication made while the General Assembly is in session
which, incidental to advocacy for or against a specific piece of
legislation pending before the General Assembly, urges the
133. Independent expenditure is defined as "an expenditure to support or oppose the
nomination or election of one or more clearly identified candidates that is made without
consultation or coordination with a candidate or agent of a candidate whose nomination
or election the expenditure supports or whose opponent's nomination or election the
expenditure opposes." Id. § 163-278.6(9a).
134. While it would seem that an unconstitutionally overbroad law would be struck
down, courts will first try to narrow the statute, following the principle that "[w]here the
constitutional requirement of definiteness is at stake, we have the further obligation to
construe the statute, if that can be done consistent with the legislature's purpose, to avoid
the shoals of vagueness." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 78 (1976) (per curiam); see also
Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) ("It has long been a tenet of
First Amendment law that in determining a facial challenge to a statute, if it be 'readily
susceptible' to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional, it will be
upheld. The key to application of this principle is that the statute must be 'readily
susceptible' to the limitation; we will not rewrite a state law to conform it to constitutional
requirements.") (citations omitted).
135. WRTL, 551 U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2667.
136. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL), 525 F.3d 274, 314 (4th Cir. 2008)
(Michael, J., dissenting).
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audience to communicate with a member or members of the




Any communication or advocacy referring to an issue before the
North Carolina General Assembly is exempted and hence no
disclosure is required. 138 However, this does not preclude all issue
advocacy from being subject to the reporting requirements, as this
exception applies only to communication "incidental to advocacy for
or against a specific piece of legislation pending before the General
Assembly." '139 Therefore, for example, an ad that called on the
Governor to sign a bill on her desk would not be subject to the
exception and would require disclosure. Given that such an example
would not fit under the constitutional definition of "functional
equivalence," the statute's limitation seems insufficient. However,
the McConnell Court, despite facing the same situation (inclusion of
some issue advocacy), nevertheless upheld the BCRA electioneering
communications law, stating, "[e]ven if we assumed that BCRA will
inhibit some constitutionally protected ... speech, that assumption
would not 'justify prohibiting all enforcement' of the law unless its
application to protected speech is substantial, 'not only in an absolute
sense, but also relative to the scope of the law's plainly legitimate
applications.' "140 Thus, while a court should find North Carolina's
electioneering communications disclosure law constitutional, it should
also narrow the law's application while providing for as-applied
challenges for situations such as that described above.
Another possible challenge to the electioneering
communications disclosure law (and to the candidate-specific
communications disclosure law) could be raised against the twenty-
four hour disclosure requirement.'41 At least one circuit has found
137. Memorandum from William R. Gilkeson, Staff Attorney, to H. Comm. on
Election Laws and Campaign Finance Reform 2 (Mar. 7, 2007) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 163-278.80(3)(d) (2007)) (emphasis omitted) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.80(3)(d) (2007). Such an exception has helped other
electioneering communication disclosure laws survive constitutional challenges. See, e.g.,
Alaska Right to Life Comm. v. Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2006).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.80(3)(d) (2007).
140. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003) (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S.
113, 120 (2003)).
141. "Disclosure date" is defined as "[t]he first date during any calendar year when an
electioneering communication is aired after an entity has incurred expenses for the direct
costs of producing or airing electioneering communications aggregating in excess of ten
thousand dollars ($10,000)" or "[a]ny other date during that calendar year by which an
entity has incurred expenses for the direct costs of producing or airing electioneering
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such a requirement too onerous, as "such immediate notice severely
burdens First Amendment rights, and the provision is a far cry from
being narrowly tailored. None of the State's compelling interests in
informing the electorate, preventing corruption and the appearance
of corruption, or gathering data would be at all compromised by a
more workable deadline. ' 142 However, in striking down the twenty-
four hour requirement, the circuit applied strict scrutiny as opposed
to intermediate scrutiny.143 If a court were to accept that intermediate
scrutiny was in fact the correct standard, a challenge to the twenty-
four hour requirement may end in a different result. Moreover, the
exact same twenty-four hour reporting requirement was before the
Court in McConnell, yet the Court made no mention of it being
onerous or overburdening 44 Notwithstanding, a challenge to the
twenty-four hour requirement raises the question of whether, if
challenged and found insufficiently supported by governmental
interests, a court would strike only this particular requirement of the
disclosure law or the entire disclosure law itself.145
In sum, as the McConnell Court found the federal counterpart to
North Carolina's electioneering communications disclosure law
facially constitutional, it is hard to see how any of the aforementioned
challenges would result in a different finding. However, a challenge
to the statute would most likely result in a narrowing instruction such
that the statute would no longer encompass any issue advocacy.
C. Candidate-Specific Communications Disclosure Law
Despite being fashioned as an extension of electioneering
communications law, North Carolina's candidate-specific disclosure
law would not likely survive a constitutional challenge. First, North
Carolina's law has no federal counterpart. While introduced and
passed on the premise that it would serve as an extension of the
electioneering communications disclosure law, and thus should be
communications aggregating in excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) since the most
recent disclosure date for that calendar year." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.80(1) (2007).
142. Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236
F.3d 1174, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000).
143. See id. at 1196-97.
144. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194-95. An imaginative plaintiff could argue the twenty-
four hour reporting requirement was not directly before the Court. However, given the
breadth of coverage by McConnell, such an argument would be unlikely to prevail.
145. See Davidson, 236 F.3d at 1198 (finding the twenty-four hour reporting period
inseverable and thus holding the entire disclosure law unconstitutional).
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subject to the same constitutional support, 46 such a contention is
unlikely. The statute does contain the same limiting provision as the
electioneering communications disclosure law for issues before the
General Assembly 4 7 and thus seemingly could be narrowed in the
same manner. However, a court could easily find the interests
supporting electioneering communications disclosure-which mostly
stem from its proximity to the election' 4S-do not support similar
disclosures during the remainder of the year. As the candidate-
specific communications disclosure law does not cover the thirty- and
sixty-day windows covered by the electioneering communications
disclosure law, "the connection between the information sought and
the governmental interest in promoting clean and well-informed
elections 'may be too remote.' "149
More notably, in light of WRTL, it is hard to fathom how this law
could withstand a constitutional challenge. Like North Carolina's
electioneering communications disclosure law, this disclosure law
does not apply to express advocacy, given that it excludes reporting
on independent expenditures. 5 ' As such, it can only apply to issue
advocacy and the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Again, it
would seem that a court could simply narrow the statute to apply only
to the functional equivalent portion. However, in its application of
WRTL, NCRL held that in order to be the functional equivalent of
express advocacy, the advocacy must be susceptible to no other
reasonable interpretation than as express advocacy, and must qualify
as an electioneering communication.' As the candidate-specific
communications disclosure law applies only to communications
146. See WILLIAM R. GILKESON, S. JUDICIARY COMM., HOUSE BILL 966:
CANDIDATE-SPECIFIC COMMUNICATIONS, 2005-2006 Sess., Reg. Sess., at 1 (2006).
147. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.100(2) (2007) ("The term 'candidate-specific
communication' does not include ... [a] communication made while the General
Assembly is in session which, incidental to advocacy for or against a specific piece of
legislation pending before the General Assembly, urges the audience to communicate with
a member or members of the General Assembly concerning that piece of legislation.").
148. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 201.
149. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 664 (5th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976) (per curiam)).
150. By definition, the candidate-specific communications disclosure law does not
apply to "independent expenditures," which are defined as those expenditures supporting
or opposing a candidate. Thus, the disclosure law can only apply to those communications
that do not support or oppose a candidate, i.e., issue advocacy. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-
278.100(2)(b) (2007).
151. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL), 525 F.3d 274, 282 (2008). But see id. at
315-17 (Michael, J., dissenting) (excoriating the majority's "bright line rule for facial
challenges that divides acceptable regulations (covering express advocacy) from
unacceptable regulations (covering issue advocacy)").
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outside the "electioneering communications" window, it fails the
NCRL test.
It is arguable that, although the candidate-specific
communications disclosure law "encompass[es] more speech than
that allowed by the [WRTL] test, the Supreme Court of the United
States has not adopted [the WRTL] test for disclosure requirements
and, indeed, has approved of disclosure requirements for otherwise
constitutionally protected speech." '152 Indeed, it has even been
suggested that WRTL technically does not apply to disclosure laws as
only the ban on corporate money during the thirty- and sixty-day
windows was at issue, not the disclosure requirements associated with
the absence of that ban. 53 Such reasoning, however, runs counter to
WRTL's strong language and the Fourth Circuit's willingness to
follow suit in NCRL. The disclosure law absolutely extends beyond
the functional equivalent of express advocacy, at least as defined by
NCRL.154 And while the statute presumptively "insure[s] that the
public knows who might be spending large amounts of money" on
communications about a specific candidate,155 such an interest is
insufficient for constitutional survival given the law's extension
beyond the bounds set by NCRL. Presumably, if given the chance, a
court would follow the constrictions of both the Fourth Circuit and
the Supreme Court and find this disclosure law unconstitutional.
One possibility remains that could save the candidate-specific
communications disclosure law. Given North Carolina's unfortunate
recent spat with corruption,'56 the State has a substantial-if not
compelling-interest in deterring corruption or the appearance
thereof, and thus the law arguably has sufficient support to survive a
challenge under intermediate scrutiny review.I5 7 As deterrence of
corruption or the appearance thereof is a clearly established
152. Id. at 324 (Michael, J., dissenting).
153. Memorandum from William R. Gilkeson, Staff Attorney, to H. Comm. on
Election Laws and Campaign Finance Reform 2 (Mar. 7, 2007) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
154. See NCRL, 525 F.3d at 282.
155. N.C. Gen. Assemb., 2005-2006 Sess., Reg. Sess., Minutes of the H. Comm. on
Rules, Calendar and Operations of the H. (July 26, 2006).
156. See Chris Kromm, The Fall of a North Carolina Political Machine, FACING
SOUTH, Feb. 14, 2007, http://southernstudies.org/facingsouth/2007/02/fall-of-north-
carolina-political.asp (detailing the guilty plea of Speaker of the House Jim Black to
federal corruption charges).
157. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 390-95
(2000) (finding Missouri established a compelling interest in support of their strict
contribution limits due to legislative testimony and newspaper records regarding the
potential corruption involved in campaign contributions to candidates).
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legitimate state interest, North Carolina has a heightened awareness
and interest in such deterrence, and it should be afforded leniency in
determining how best to achieve that interest.158 WRTL and NCRL
may stand as a barrier to this argument as they have narrowed
functional equivalence such that it excludes candidate-specific
communications. From Buckley to NCRL, the court has made clear
that state interests such as informing the electorate, gathering data to
detect violations, and deterring corruption only support regulation of
that which is "unambiguously campaign related." '159 As such, even
under an intermediate scrutiny review, the most likely outcome seems
to be the candidate-specific communications disclosure law would be
found unconstitutional.160
CONCLUSION
Disclosure laws clearly cross into First Amendment territory,
chilling constitutionally protected speech. However, the courts have
found reason to uphold their constitutionality, most notably
stemming from government's interest in preventing political
corruption. Analysis of past disclosure cases indicates disclosure laws
are subject to an "exacting," yet intermediate, level of scrutiny.
While cutting against precedent, there is some support for a higher
level of scrutiny, both to disclosure laws in general, and for particular
disclosure laws that may be atypically onerous. Assuming
intermediate scrutiny applies, as long as these laws are tailored such
that they regulate only express advocacy or its functional equivalent,
thereby fitting within the lines drawn by WRTL, they clear the largest
hurdle of their constitutional challenge. Other possible pitfalls
remain where the governmental interest does not justify intrusion, as
when laws require disclosure of insignificant dollar amounts or place
immediacy requirements on disclosure well-removed from the
campaign season. Both the Supreme Court, in the Buckley progeny,
and the Fourth Circuit, as exemplified by NCRL, have shown no
hesitancy in striking down campaign finance laws that stray from the
acceptable state interests listed in Buckley, affect issue advocacy, or
158. In response to the growing concerns about corruption, North Carolina has also
passed significant lobbying reform. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov.
Easley Signs Lobbying Reform Bill into Law (Sept. 30, 2005) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
159. See supra notes 16, 100-07 and accompanying text.
160. While not discussed in NCRL, a court could potentially subject the candidate-
specific communication disclosure law to a strict scrutiny analysis given its inclusion of
issue advocacy. This, however, would not seem to improve the statute's chances.
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place too onerous a burden on the party of whom disclosure is
required.
Of the three disclosure laws reviewed, North Carolina's
independent expenditure disclosure law is most likely to survive a
constitutional challenge. NCRL's narrowing of related statutes
sufficiently cabins the disclosure law to express advocacy.
Conversely, due to NCRL, North Carolina's candidate-specific
communications disclosure law regulates only issue advocacy. Given
the Supreme Court's disdain for statutes that interfere with issue
advocacy, the candidate-specific communications disclosure law
would unlikely survive a facial constitutional challenge. So too could
be the fate of the electioneering communications disclosure law.
However, while it requires disclosure of some issue advocacy, it gains
strength in having a federal counterpart and internal limitations as to
how much issue advocacy it affects. As such, a court should be able
to narrow the statute's application to a constitutionally permissible
spectrum. Regardless, further clarification is needed in order to
strike the proper constitutional balance between the benefits of these
laws and their potential for chilling the constitutional rights of North
Carolinians.
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